RSHD(8) MachTen System Manager’s Manual RSHD(8)
NAME
rshd - remote shell server
SYNOPSIS
rshd [-alnL]
DESCRIPTION
The rshd server is the server for the rcmd(3) routine and,
consequently,
for the rsh(1) program. The server provides remote execution
facilities
with authentication based on privileged port numbers from
trusted hosts.
The rshd server listens for
service requests at the port indicated in the
‘‘cmd’’ service specification; see
services(5). When a service request
is received the following protocol is initiated:
1. The server checks the
client’s source port. If the port is not in
the range 512-1023, the server aborts the connection.
2. The server reads characters
from the socket up to a null (‘ ’)
byte. The resultant string is interpreted as an ASCII
number, base
10.
3. If the number received in
step 2 is non-zero, it is interpreted as
the port number of a secondary stream to be used for the
stderr. A
second connection is then created to the specified port on
the
client’s machine. The source port of this second
connection is also
in the range 512-1023.
4. The server checks the
client’s source address and requests the cor-
responding host name (see gethostbyaddr(3), hosts(5) and
named(8)).
If the hostname cannot be determined, the dot-notation
representa-
tion of the host address is used. If the hostname is in the
same
domain as the server (according to the last two components
of the
domain name), or if the -a option is given, the addresses
for the
hostname are requested, verifying that the name and address
corre-
spond. If address verification fails, the connection is
aborted
with the message, ‘‘Host address
mismatch.’’
5. A null terminated user name
of at most 16 characters is retrieved on
the initial socket. This user name is interpreted as the
user iden-
tity on the client’s machine.
6. A null terminated user name
of at most 16 characters is retrieved on
the initial socket. This user name is interpreted as a user
identi-
ty to use on the server’s machine.
7. A null terminated command to
be passed to a shell is retrieved on
the initial socket. The length of the command is limited by
the up-
per bound on the size of the system’s argument
list.
8. Rshd then validates the user
using ruserok(3), which uses the file
/etc/hosts.equiv and the .rhosts file found in the
user’s home di-
rectory. The -l option prevents ruserok(3) from doing any
valida-
tion based on the user’s
‘‘.rhosts’’ file, unless the user is
the
superuser.
9. If the file /etc/nologin
exists and the user is not the superuser,
the connection is closed.
10. A null byte is returned on
the initial socket and the command line
is passed to the normal login shell of the user. The shell
inherits
the network connections established by rshd.
Transport-level keepalive
messages are enabled unless the -n option is
present. The use of keepalive messages allows sessions to be
timed out
if the client crashes or becomes unreachable.
The -L option causes all
successful accesses to be logged to syslogd(8)
as auth.info messages.
DIAGNOSTICS
Except for the last one listed below, all diagnostic
messages are re-
turned on the initial socket, after which any network
connections are
closed. An error is indicated by a leading byte with a value
of 1 (0 is
returned in step 10 above upon successful completion of all
the steps
prior to the execution of the login shell).
Locuser too long.
The name of the user on the client’s machine is longer
than 16
characters.
Ruser too long.
The name of the user on the remote machine is longer than 16
characters.
Command too long.
The command line passed exceeds the size of the argument
list (as
configured into the system).
Login incorrect.
No password file entry for the user name existed.
Remote directory.
The chdir command to the home directory failed.
Permission denied.
The authentication procedure described above failed.
Can’t make pipe.
The pipe needed for the stderr, wasn’t created.
Can’t fork; try again.
A fork by the server failed.
<shellname>: ...
The user’s login shell could not be started. This
message is re-
turned on the connection associated with the stderr, and is
not
preceded by a flag byte.
SEE ALSO
rsh(1), rcmd(3), ruserok(3)
BUGS
The authentication procedure used here assumes the integrity
of each
client machine and the connecting medium. This is insecure,
but is use-
ful in an ‘‘open’’ environment.
A facility to allow all data exchanges to be encrypted should be present.
A more extensible protocol (such as Telnet) should be used.
4.2 Berkeley Distribution June 4, 1993 2